Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1976

State of Utah v. Thayne Larry Walker : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Brian A. White; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant; Larry R. Keller; Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association; Amicus Curiae on Brief.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Walker, No. 14322.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/267

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

-;;ME C O U R T
UTAH
r,QijM,EN T

m»fi

45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

^

SMM1977

un TtiiS SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.
THAYNE LARRY WALKER,

se No. 14322

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty rendered in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
I the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding.

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

BRIAN A. WHITE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
343 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
Attorney for Appellant
LARRY R. KELLER
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
343 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
Amicus Curiae on Brief

FILED
AUG 1 0 1976
£ £ 3 3 ^ * *s,w.. *«*••*-*<« »-*•*««•«' • * « « « • « •

X

JCIerfc. Suprsma Court, Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT . .

1
. .1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

.2

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE ACTIONS OF OFFICER HANKS CONSTITUTED A SEIZURE
OF THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT WALKER AND SUCH ACTIONS COME
WITHIN THE PROTECTION OF FDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS PROHIBITING UNREASONABLE SEIZURES
5
A. THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS A SEIZURE OF HIS
PERSON, AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

5

B. THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT BY DEPUTY HANKS EXCEEDED
THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY STATUTE AND WAS THEREFORE AN
ARREST
7
C. THE DEFENDANT WALKER WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST AT THE
TIME OF DEPUTY HANKS* RETURN FROM THE APARTMENT COMPLEX AND
AT THAT TIME FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS ATTACHED . . . 11
POINT II. THE ARREST AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS
WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND THEREFORE VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §77-13-33
(1953) as amended
11
POINT III. ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE VEHICLE
PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE
THAT SEARCH WARRANT WAS TAINTED BY THE UNLAWFUL ARREST. .25
CONCLUSION

26
CASES CITED

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 at 162

. 12

Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959) . . 16
Eringer v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 at 176 (1948)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

Table of Contents (continued)
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 at 103 (1959)

16,22,23,24

People v. Miller, 7 Ca. 3d 219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr. 19
People v. Ware, 484 P.2d 102 (Colo. 1971)

22

Remers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470
P.2d 11, 87 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970)
20,21,22
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878)

16

State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975)

6

State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968). . . . 24
State v. Eastmond 28 Utah 2d 124 P.2d 276 (1972) . . . . . . .17, 18,19
State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969) . . . . . 16
State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d 422 (1971) . . . .25
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 20 L. Ed 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)6,7,8,9,11
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct.
407 (1963)
25
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment . . . . . . . . .5
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14

5

STATUTES CITED

-

Utah Code Ann. §41-1-17 (c) (1953 as amended) . .'. . . .
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206 (1953)

13

Utah Code Ann. §77-13-3 (1953)
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-33 (1953 as amended) . . . . . .

. . 11

14,16
. . . .7,9,10,11,12

Utah Code Ann. §77-13-34 (1953)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7, 14

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

THAYNE LARRY WALKER

:

Case No. 14322

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Burglary, a felony of
the second degree, and Theft, a Class A misdemeanor, rendered by jury,
in the Third District Court for the State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Thayne Larry Walker, was convicted by a jury
of the crimes of Burglary and Theft on October 2, 1975, in the court
of the Honorable Peter F. Leary, and was sentenced to serve the
indeterminate term provided by law in the Utah State Prison,
namely 1-15 years and one year concurrently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt entered against
him and a new trial in this matter.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 2;25 p.m. on July 21, 1975, Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Deputy Mike Hanks was holding surveillance on an apartment
complex located at 1840 West 6th North in Salt Lake City.

From his

position in a vacant house, he observed Defendants Thayne Walker
and Robert Davis at the complex, but he lost sight of them when they
went around in front of a building.

(T.37) Hanks then entered his

patrol car and proceeded to 6th North, hoping to relocate the
defendants.

Unable to relocate them, he returned to the apartment

complex and held surveillance for another ten minutes.

Hanks then

proceeded to 4th North and was driving east toward Redwood Road when he
saw the defendants in a Volkswagen van driven by Defendant Walker, in
a driveway to an apartment complex at 1740 West 4th North.
remained in the driveway while Hanks1 vehicle passed.

The van

Deputy Hanks

waved to the defendants, and Defendant Davis, who knew Hanks, waved
back.

Deputy Hanks then pulled his vehicle off to the side of the

road to allow the defendants to pass, but they instead pulled over and
parked behind his patrol car.
Deputy Hanks and Defendant Davis, the passenger, exited their
respective vehicles and engaged in light conversation, with Davis stating
that he had been visiting a friend in the apartment complex.

(T.38)

At this point Deputy Hanks instructed Davis to return to the Volkswagen
and then asked Defendant Walker for his driver's license. Walker
exited the van and produced a license.

Hanks instructed him to remain

in the van while he went back to the patrol car to check the license for
revocations.

Upon checking with the dispatcher, Deputy Hanks
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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determined there were no revocations and the license was valid.

(T.39)

Deputy Hanks then returned to the van and engaged in conversation with
Defendant Walker.

Hanks then returned to his patrol car and "radioed the

city to send a city officer for assistance.11

(Transcript of

Suppression Hearing, p. 11). Deputy Hanks testified that he made that
request because he "wanted to check the apartment complex to see if there
was a possible burglary there."

(Id.) He also expressly stated that at

this time he had not observed anything unusual about the van.
Hanks then returned to the van and asked Davis to step out.

(Id.)

Davis

did so and at this point Deputy Hanks observed some stereo equipment
in the back of the van.

At this time Defendant Davis remarked that

"he didn't know anything about it (the stereo equipment)

..."

(T.39)
The two continued to engage in small talk about Davisf girl friend
until Hanks instructed Davis to return to the van.

He then went to the

patrol car and contacted the dispatcher to determine if the city officers
were enroute when Officer Crokett and another Salt Lake City officer
arrived.

Hanks instructed them to watch the two defendants while he

check the apartment complex from which the defendants had just come.
He went to the apartment complex, went upstairs, and knocked
on a door.

Hanks asked the resident if he had seen two men in the

apartment complex.

The resident replied in the negative.

(T. 41)

Hanks then went downstairs and observed a partially opened door. The

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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door was approximately a foot and a half open and appeared to have
been forced because the wood frame appeared to have been splintered.
Looking inside, Hanks saw a lamp turned over and the interior of
the apartment in disarray.

(T. 42)

Deputy Hanks returned upstairs and questioned the resident, with
whom he had previously talked, concerning the occupants of the apartment
below.

He was informed that it belonged to the Talayumptuewas and

that Mrs. Talayumptuewa

worked at the Sears1 warehouse.

Hanks then

returned to the location of the vehicles and placed the defendants under
arrest for the crime of burglary.

He then requested the dispatcher

to contact Mrs. Talayumptuewa and have her come to her apartment to
determine if there were any missing items.
Deputy Hanks then impounded the defendants1 vehicle by
calling a commercial towing firm which transported the van to a
secured location.

When Mrs. Talayumptuewa arrived at her apartment,

an inventory of the missing items was prepared.

Deputy Hanks then went

to the County Attorney's Office where a search warrant affidavit was
prepared.

A warrant to search the vehicle for the missing items was

issued by a Salt Lake City Judge.
Defendants Walker and Davis had been simultaneously taken to the
county jail and were incarcerated on charges of burgLary and theft.
Prior to executing the warrant for the search of the vehicle,
Hanks contacted Mr. Talayumptuewa by telephone from the towing company's
office.

The vehicle was then searched and items of stereo equipment

listed in the warrant were recovered from inside the van.
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In response

to the phone call, Hanks went to the apartment complex again and was
given the broken tip of a screwdriver.(T. 44)
At the trial the defendants moved to suppress introduction of
the evidence (stereo equipment, tools, a piggy bank, and silver dollars)
on the grounds that (1) it was fruit of an illegal arrest and (2) that
the prosecution had introduced no search warrants to justify the searches
that were made.
admitted.

These motions were denied and the evidence was

The jury returned verdicts of guilty against both defendants

and they were sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTIONS OF OFFICER HANKS CONSTITUTED A SEIZURE OF THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT WALKER AND SUCH ACTIONS COME WITHIN
THE PROTECTION OF FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
PROHIBITING UNREASONABLE SEIZURES.
A. THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS A SEIZURE OF HIS
PERSON, AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized;
The Constitution of the State of Utah has an almost identical provision
in Article I, Section 14. Inherent in these two documents imposing

-5-
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Limitations upon government power is the concept of the right of the
citizenry to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.
The State in the proceedings below has seemed to use the
:erms "arrest11 and "detain" almost interchangeably, or at least in
such a manner as to blur any distinction between the two.

Perhaps

:his is proper, in light of the constitutional implications involved in
>oth terms. However, it is necessary to lay a foundation, in order to
lake a distinction.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 20, L.Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868
[1968) the Supreme Court of the United States had an opportunity to
ixamine a situation involving the detention of a suspect.

That court

itated:
We, therefore, reject the notion that the Fourth Amendment
does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police
conduct if the officers stop short of something called a
"technical arrest" or "full blown search." 392 U.S. at 19.
In State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975) this :court recognized
:hat provisions of both the State and Federal Constitutions are invoked
n situations involving detentions.

The Utah Court, favorably citing

erry, supra, as holding that arrests without a warrant may only be made
ipon probable cause, quoted from the Terry opinion:
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment covers 'seizures1
of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the
station house and prosecution for crime -- 'arrests1 in
traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized1 that person.
541 P. 2d at 801.

-6-
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The Utah Supreme Court has not been presented with any cases
arising under the present "detention" statute, Utah Code Ann.
§77-13-33 (1953); nevertheless, the almost exact similarity of the
language of the Constitutional provisions involved and the fundamental
policy reasons underlying such an interpretation should be reason
enough to enable this court to hold, as in Terry, that "detentions"
come within the scope of Constitutional protection.
B. THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT BY DEPUTY HANKS EXCEEDED
THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY STATUTE AND WAS THEREFORE AN
ARREST.
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-33 (1953), as amended, entitled "Authority
of peace officer to stop and question suspect -- Grounds", provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place whom he
has probable cause to believe:
(1) is in the act of committing a crime;
(2) has committed a crime; or
(3) is attempting to commit a crime;
and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of
his actions.
This section enacted in 1967 is a legislative act providing a peace
officer "with authoirty to detain a suspect temporarily for questioning
and search him for dangerous weapons."

Section 77-13-34, which comprises

the second section of the Act, grants the officer authority to conduct
a search of the person for dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes
he or any other person is in danger of life or limb.

The defendant submits

that this statute was enacted merely to grant the officer authority to
make a limited detention of a person in a public place.
for situations like that in Terry, supra,

It was designed

where an experienced officer

had grounds to believe a crime was about to occur.

In Terry the officer

perceived very suspicious activity and made a limited detention for the
Digitized by the the
Howard W.
Hunter Law Library,
Law School, BYU.The search of the
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ofJ. Reuben
the Clark
suspects.
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person, conducted for the officer's personal safety, was merely
incident to that detention even though it produced the weapon, the
carrying of which was a crime for which the suspect was later prosecuted.
Had the officer been given a satisfactory explanation as to the suspect's
activities so as to dispel his suspicions about them, and had the officer
found no weapons during his limited search, he would have been obliged
to release the individuals and allow them to proceed on their way.
The intent of the Utah Statute is analogous.

It allows the

officer to "stop" and "demand" of an individual his name, address and an
explanation of his actions, if he has a basis for any of the three
statutory grounds.

Upon receiving such, he is obliged to release the

person at that time unless he has other grounds to hold him.
It appears that the statute requires a higher standard, (i.e. "probable
cause"), than is required by Terry, supra.
Concerning this lesser standard, the Terry opinion stated:
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional
propriety of an investigative "seizure" upon less than
probable cause for purposes of "detention" and/or interrogation.
Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen
and citizens involve "seizures" of persons. Only when the
officer, by some means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a "seizure" has occurred.
392 U.S. at 20.
The first sentence of that paragraph would seem to indicate the U.S.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that a "detention" may be based upon
a showing of less than probable cause.
here because:

That is certainly not the issue

(1) the relevant Utah statute authorizing detention

specifically requires probable cause; (2) the State did not attempt to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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justify the detention as flowing from a non-statutory authority to
detain on less than probable cause; and (3) such a concept is clearly
contradictory to the remainder of the language in the Terry opinion,
as well as contradictory to provisions in both the U. S. and Utah
constitutions requiring probable cause for seizures.
As applied to the facts in this case, Deputy Hanks1 actions
certainly constituted a "seizure" of the defendants. He had gone
well beyond the scope of the detention authorized by Section 77-13-33.
After he had obtained the defendant^1 names, addresses and an explanation
of their actions he was obliged to release them.
request a back-up unit.

He was not authorized to

He was not authorized to have Davis exit the

vail a second time. These actions constituted an arrest. As per the
Terry opinion, it certainly was a "seizure11 of the person because he had,
by show of authority, restrained their liberty.

The defendants knew that

Deputy Hanks was conducting some kind of official investigation of them
based upon his actions:

checking the driver's license of Walker, calling

for the back-up unit, (T. 62) and having Davis exit the vehicle.
Certainly a reasonable person in this situation, upon observing the
arrival of a second police unit and hearing Deputy Hanks1 instruction to
the others to "watch these guys", would perceive he was not free to
leave.

If he were, there would be no need to instruct the city officers

to "watch" the defendants.

This cannot be construed to mean "follow them ai

see where they go"; it means (implicit with Deputy Hanks1 actions),

-9-
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4

"I think these guys did something and I'm going to investigate."

i

A reasonable person would have believed he was in official custody
at that time. There was even testimony that such detention by Deputy
Hanks had occurred twice prior to this incident.

(T. 134). Such

I

previous detentions by Officer Hanks, although clearly improper,
were not the subject of any assertion of right to privacy or to be
free from such an unreasonable search because at those instances

4

such "detentions11 produced no criminal charges.
At the trial, the prosecution attempted to rely on Utah Code
Ann. §77-13-33 (1953),as amended, to authorize the arrest of the
defendants.

I

However, that section was specifically enacted to allow

police officers some authority to stop and detain suspected persons
long enough to allow the officer to make inquiry into the person's
activities.

i

The section cannot be construed to allow an unlimited

detention so long as necessary for the officer to conduct an
investigation of the area for possible criminal activities.

Defendants

i

in the present case gave a reasonable explanation for their presence
at the complex; they had been visiting a friend.
unusual.

Their conduct was not unusual.

The time of day was not

There was no possible reason

i

for the officer to continue to hold them any longer than was necessary
to determine the reasons for their being in the area.

Once he received

their answer, which, on its fact,is satisfactory in light of all the

i

circumstances involved, the detention should have ceased.

-10-
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i

Likewise inapplicable is any reliance the State may place upon
the officer's authority to stop the vehicle under provision of Utah
Code Ann. §41-l-17(c) (1953), as amended.

Deputy Hanks, although he

did check the driver's license of Walker, did not stop the vehicle
for any operational violations.

Moreover, Defendant Walker's license

was in order, and free from any warrants or holds.
C. THE DEFENDANT WALKER WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST AT THE TIME
OF DEPUTY HANKS! RETURN FROM THE APARTMENT COMPLEX AND
AT THAT TIME FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS ATTACHED.
There was testimony by Deputy Hanks (T.42) that he placed the two
defendants under arrest upon his return from the apartment complex.

On

cross-examination, Deputy Hanks explained his actions as that of
searching the individuals, handcuffing them, and indicating to them they
were under arrest for burglary. (T.63)
concede

Clearly, the State must

that a seizure had occurred at that point.

Such a seizure

comes within the scope of the United States and State Constitutions
(Terry, supra, p.6) and this court must determine whether the officer
had probable cause for such arrest.
POINT II.
THE ARREST-AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THEREFORE VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §77-13-33 (1953),
as amended.
As previously noted, both the United States Constitution, and the
Utah Constitution require "probable cause11 for the issuance of a warrant

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(

i

to search or to seize.

Although there is a judicial preference for the

issuance of a warrant, the courts have realized that a warrant is not,
per se, required for a seizure.

However, if the intent of these

Constitutional provisions is to be followed, the standard of probable
cause ought to be the same for seizures which do not have judicial
approval through a warrant.

The concept of probable cause involves
i

more than just suspicion.

There must be evidence which would "warrant

a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that a crime has been
committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 at 162. A relaxation
i

Df this standard for probable cause would "leave law-abiding citizens
at the mercy of the

officerfs whim or caprice." Eringer

v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948) at 176.
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-33 (1953), as amended, discussed previously,
provides authorization for an officer to stop a person in a public
slace and demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his
i

actions when the officer "has reasonable cause to believe" he:
(1) is in the act of committing a crime;
(2) has committed a crime; or
(3) is attempting to commit a crime.
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-3 (1953), as amended, lists six grounds
lpon which an officer may make an arrest without a warrant:
(1) For a public offense committed in his presence.
?his is obviously not involved in this case.

-12-
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(2) When the person arrested has committed a felony, although
not in his presence.
Again, a situation which is not involved in the case at bar,
(3) When he has reasonable cause for believing the person to
have committed a public offense, although not in his presence.
This subsection would appear to be the one the State uses to justify
the arrest in this case.

A discussion of this point follows this

summary of the statute.
(4) When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have
committed it.
This subsection cannot reasonably apply to this situation where the
officer did not know the equipment in the van was stolen at all, let alone
that it came from an apparently burglarized apartment.

Furthermore, the

officer had determined only that an apartment had been broken into,
not that a theft had been committed, a fact essential to make the crime
of burglary.

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206 (1953), as amended, makes

a person who unlawfully enters a building guilty of the crime of criminal
trespass, a Class B misdemeanor.
applicable without the

Therefore, this subsection is not

officerfs knowledge that a theft had been

committed.
(5) On a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of the
commission of a felony by the person arrested.
This subsection is not applicable because no other person made such a
charge.

i-,y
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(6) At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe
he has committed a felony.
Since this was a daytime occurrence (2:30 p.m.) this subsection is
-

clearly not applicable. .;>
This indicates an anomaly in the Utah statutes.

The legislature

has given officers authority to "detain11 if they have probable cause
but would permit the officer to arrest (77-13-3) upon what would appear
to be the lower standard of "reasonable cause11.

There may be no

legal distinction between these two terms; but if there is, then it
would seem that probable cause is the higher standard.

Thus, the State

may not rely on the authority of the detention statute to authorize
a detention upon a lesser showing than that of probable cause.

If

any other interpretation is given to this statute, Defendant submits
that enactment of Section 77-13-33, as it is presently written, would
have been totally unnecessary because given the three statutory
requirements for stopping the person and asking his name, etc., the
officer could execute a "technical arrest" of the person.

Surely he

should need no authority to make a lesser intrusion upon the person's
privacy and security if he merely desired to obtain his name, address,
and an explanation of his actions.

The statute (77-13-34) granting

authority to search for weapons would likewise be unnecessary because
a search for weapons could be made as incident to an arrest, but may
be necessary for situations wherein the person is not arrested.
At the time Deputy Hanks formulated the intent to detain the
the defendants and took action to accomplish that end (i.e. requesting
the dispatcher to send a city officer to his location to detain the
defendants while he looked for a "possible burglary") he knew the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

following facts:
1.

Defendant Walker and his companion had been in another part

of town approximately ten minutes earlier;
2.

Defendant Davis was known to Deputy Hanks, but the driver

of the vehicle, Defendant Walker, was unknown;
3.

Both defendants had a prior arrest;

4.

The vehicle had pulled out of an apartment complex;

5.

Defendant Davis waved to him in response to his wave;

6.

Defendant Walker pulled the bus to the curb behind the

police car
7.

and Davis exited the vehicle and approached Deputy Hanks;
The driver of the vehicle (Walker) had a valid drivers

license;
Surely these facts alone are insufficient to constitute "probable cause11
for detention under Section 77-13-33.

Even at the time Officer Crockett

and his partner arrived at the scene and were instructed to "watch11
the defendants while Hanks left and went looking for a "possible burglary,"
only four additional facts were known:
1.

Davis told him they had been visiting a friend in the apart-

ment complex;
2.

There was stereo equipment in the back of the van;

3.

The van was not registered to Defendant Davis;

4.

Davis, a passenger, made an unsolicited statement about

his lack of knowledge concerning the stereo equipment in the van.
These facts, in essence, constituted the total quantum of Deputy Hanks1
knowledge concerning the defendants and their relationship to the
stereo equipment, the van, and the apartment complex.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Surely these

marginal facts cannot be construed to constitute ''probable cause11
(required for detent ion under 77-13-33) or "reasonable cause11
(required for arrest under 77-13-3(3).

The most apparent reason

for the non-existence of probable cause is that the officer had no
knowledge a crime had been committed, much less that it had been
committed by the defendant.

Reliance by the State upon Draper

v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959) allowing detention
if the officer can articulate "specific facts",.

is misapplied in

this case because here all the specific facts are "outwardly innocent";
Henry v. U.S., 361 U.S. 98 at 103 (1959); in Draper the acts were
certainly suspicious.
In State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969), this
Jourt defined the requirement for probable cause for a warrantless
arrest in accordance with Section 77-13-3(3) by saying:
The requirement, as in so many areas of law, is one of
reason, that it may be shown under the facts and
circumstances known to the officer, a reasonable and
prudent man in his position would be justified in
believing the suspect had committed the offense.
451 P.2d at 775.
The quoted sentence has a footnote referring to the early United States
Jupreme Court case of Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878) where the
concept of probable cause was considered.

The Stacey opinion contains

:wo definitions from earlier cases as to what constitutes probable
tause.

The first is by Mr. Justice Washington:
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(a) reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
in the belief that the party is guilty of the offense of which
he is charged.
97 U.S. at 645.
Even when the seizure ("full blown arrest") occurred upon Hanks1
return to the place where the defendants were waiting, the officer
only knew two additional facts:
1.

That an apartment was apparently benn broken into; and

2.

That the resident upstairs did not see or hear anything.

It is significant to point out what Officer Hanks did not know at that
time.

He did not know if any stereo equipment had been stolen.

Thus,

the remark made by Davis about such equipment and its actual
physical presence inside the van could have no basis for probable
cause to seize (arrest) the defendant for theft of stereo equipment.
Davis was merely a passenger in a vehicle being driven by another.
Such lack of knowledge on his part is entirely logical and thus the
remark cannot be construed to constitute probable cause.
The State relied upon the case of State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah
2d 124, 499 P.2d 276 (1972) in an attempt to justify the arrest in
the case at bar.

In that case, a Nephi policeman had seen car lights

flash on in the Nebo Medical Center parking lot at 3 a.m. He then saw
the car leaving the parking lot. He stopped the car and after he had
made a brief investigation as to the occupants' identities, he allowed the
car to proceed.

The officer then returned to the clinic and upon

investigation, observed a broken window and a door open at the clinic.

-17-
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e radioed ahead to other units to have the auto stopped and the
ccupants arrested.
robable cause.

In Eastmond, this court found that the officer had

However,: Defendant submits that the case is

{

efficiently different from the case at bar in several key issues
slevant to a finding of probable cause:
1.

The lateness of the hour (3a.m.);

• ""

2.

The location, which would not normally have teen-age

Lsitors at that late hour;
3.

The officer saw the lights "flash on" and the car drive

m y from the clinic, meaning the lights were

lf

off" before he

>served the car, most likely to avoid detection;
4.

The officer observed, in plain view, items inherently

ispicious:" a small

{

ff

doctorfs bagM and some small bottles of alcohol.

lese facts, taken together, may have been enough at that point to
mstitute probable cause to arrest, but the officer did not detain the

{

idividuals any longer; after being told their "explanation11 of their
:tions he allowed the vehicle to proceed.

Only after he had determined

iat an offense (a burglary) had apparently been committed did he

<

tdio ahead and effect the arrest of the occupants.
That action should be contrasted with the present case where:
1.

There was a lawful, and not unreasonable or unusual,

:planation as to the defendants' presence in the apartment complex
irking lot;
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2.

A not unusual hour (2:30 in the afternoon) was involved;

3.

The officer saw no items of identifiable contraband or

even items which might arouse a suspicion that it was contraband.
Certainly many more young men carry stereo equipment in their automobiles than carry "doctor's bags11. Deputy Hanks was unaware of any
offense being committed; yet he (unlike the officer in the Eastmond
case) seized the defendants and then went looking for probable
cause.
The plain view doctrine cannot be relied upon to justify the
seizure of the stereo equipment because that doctrine is only applicable
to items which the officer has probable cause to believe are contraband
of some nature.
People v. Miller, 7 Ca. 3d 219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr.
860 (1972), involved an arrest for an outstanding traffic warrant.
At the time of the arrest (3 a.m.) the police noticed electronic
musical equipment in the back of the defendant's van.

On appeal for

a conviction of possession of marijuana the state attempted to show there
were sufficient grounds to arrest the defendant for burglary, thereby
allowing a more extensive search of the defendant and his vehicle
than could otherwise be made.

The Supreme Court of California responded

to this assertion as follows:
. . . the additional fact that he happened to be carrying
electronic equipment at that time, would not, in itself,
support an inference that the equipment had been stolen,
particularly since the police had not received any report of the
theft of such material. (Emphasis added)
496 P.2d at 1232.
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uch analysis is especially relevant to the present case where the
olice (Deputy Hanks) had received no report of any burglary at the
ime of the initial seizure and, even later, when he suspected a burglary

{

ad taken place, he still did not know there had been a theft of stereo
luipment.

In fact, at the time he initially decided to detain the

sfendants, Hanks did not even know they were carrying the stereo

4

juipment. He only knew they were exiting the parking lot of an
>artment complex.
In Remers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 2 Cal. 3d

(

>9, 470 P.2d 11, 87 Cal. Rptr. 202, (1970), the California Supreme
>urt granted a defendant's petition for a Writ of Mandamus to compel
ippression of evidence.

The court there held that the officers did

I

»t have probable cause to arrest the defendant when they saw her reach
tto her purse and withdraw a tinfoil wrapped packet which she
ansferred to another person, who then passed to her what appeared to
money.

4

The court felt that such activity was by itself innocent

d would not constitute probable cause to arrest the individuals
r drug trafficking.

Likewise, it cannot be said that merely carrying

4

ereo equipment in the back of a van constitutes probable cause,
rtainly more people carry items in trucks than pass small packages
tin-foil in exchange for money.

All such people should not be subject

arrest because the property in such vans might be stolen.

4

The

ners court continued:

i
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Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity
as with the criminal activity, a detention based on those
events is unlawful (cases cited); a fortiori, an arrest
and search based on these events is unlawful.
470 P.2d at 13.
The State attempts to elevate Deputy Hanks1 simple suspicion
to the level of probable cause by relying on the knowledge of Officer
Hanks that Defendant Davis had a criminal record.
probable cause

Such a basis for

is not listed in the statutory grounds for arrest.

In Remers, supra, the California court stated:
We have held that a prior related conviction, when known by
the arresting officers, has Mat best only a slight tendency"
to establish a present violation of the law . . . 470 P.2d at 16.
Applied to the facts of the present case, it is apparent Deputy Hanks
had no probable cause to detain or arrest the defendant.
of was the defendant's previous arrest record.

All he knew

Such .knowledge cannot

be elevated to the level of probable cause, for to do so would be to
relegate an arrested person to the status of second class citizen.
Specifically, the Defendant Davis would never in his life be allowed
to transport in a vehicle any item which might be stolen, because any
officer who knew he had the prior burglary arrest would be allowed
to arrest him.

Any item he would have might be stolen, thus he is

precluded from carrying any sizeable personal property, so as to
avoid arrest.

And it doesn't matter that the officer does not know

if a theft has been committed; he can merely "hold" the suspect (that
is, "have him watched") while he goes out looking for an apparent
burglary and theft; and if he determines there might have been a theft
or a burglary in the area, then he can arrest that person, even when
he doesn't know what was taken.

The defendant submits that this situation
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<

s the very evil the framers of the United States and State Constitutions
>resaw and sought to prevent.

Moreover, the defendant Walker was

)t even known to the officer.

Certainly the mere fact of a prior

lowledge of the defendant Davis* background could not add to

i

4

robable cause for the detention and arrest of Walker.
Remers was followed in People v. Ware, 484 P.2d 103 (Colo. 1971).
Le defendant had voluntarily appeared at the police station to assist
friend under arrest for theft.

I

An Officer Bates learned from a

puty Schaefer that the defendant had been involved with narcotics,
id information originating from a confidential informant.

Bates

I

ticed in the defendants pocket an aluminum foil package, and a
arch presuming a relationship to narcotics was upheld by the trial
urt.

On appeal, the higher court cited Remers, and held that since

4

ny legal substances were wrapped in aluminum foil, probable cause
s not established because the conduct was as likely innocent as
ilty.

(Id. at 105).

«

In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), federal officers
served one Pierotti, about whom they had received information concerning
sft from interstate shipments, removing cartons from a residence and
ading them into his car.
3 cartons.

4

The agents took him into custody and seized

It was not until two hours later, after the suspect

I been arrested and taken to the federal offices, that the agents

I

irned the cartons contained stolen radios, not liquors as they had

-22-
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4

suspected.

In Henry the prosecution had conceded that the arrest occurr

when the officers stopped the automobile.
Court said:

The United States Supreme

f

•'•";

When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their
liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was
complete. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether
at or before that time they had reasonable cause to believe
that a crime had been committed. The fact that afterwards
contraband was discovered is not enough. An arrest is not
justified by what the subsequent search discloses. (Emphasis
added).
361 U.S. at 103.
Concerning the issue of probable cause for the arrest, the Court
continued:
On the record there was far from enough evidence against him
to justify a magistrate in issuing a warrant . . . Riding
in the car, stopping in an alley, peicking up packages,
driving away
these acts were all acts that were outwardly
innocent.
361 U.S. at 103.
Certainly it must be conceded that Defendant Walker's activity
in leaving the apartment complex with the stereo equipment in the van
at 2:30 irf the afternoon was "outwardly innocent" and thus is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause.
The Court in Henry, supra, at 104, stated that "(t)he police
must have reasonable grounds to believe the stereo equipment in the
van was contraband."

Since he had received no report of any stereo

equipment stolen in that area, Deputy Hanks' conclusion was merely
conjecture.

As in Henry, the police did not determine the stereo equipm

was stolen until some hours later, when the Talayuemptuewas had inventor
ied their loss and the van had been serached all subsequent to the
arrest and incarceration of the defendants.
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<

I
The Henry opinion continues:
The fact that the suspects were in an automobile is not enough.
Carroll v. United States, supra, liberalized the rule governing
searches when a moving vehicle is involved. But that decision
merely relaxed the requirement for a warrant on the grounds
of practicality. It did not dispense with the need for
probable cause.
361 U.S. at 104.

^

Mr. Justice Douglas summed up the entire impact of the court's
>lding in Henry:
To repeat, an arrest is not justified by what the subsequent
search discloses. Under our system, suspicion is not enough
for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is better, so
the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty sometimes go
free than the citizens be subject to easy arrest.
361 U.S. at 104.
Finally, this court has enhanced the principle that "fishing
peditions" are not justified by the results.

In State v. Criscola

'

^

Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968), this court upheld a conviction
ere the defendant was stopped driving a stolen car without a valid
ivers license.

The court, having grounds for finding probable

*

use in the case, did state:
. . . we acknowledge our
proposition that a peace
justifiable excuse, stop
expedition search of the

agreement generally with the
officer may not, without
a citizen and conduct a fishing
automobile for evidence of crime.
Id. at 519.
Like the Criscola situation, defendant Walker was violating no traffic
*s, and an impound search incident to a traffic arrest was not

*

'

solved.

«
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POINT III
ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE VEHICLE PURSUANT TO A SEARCH
WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THAT SEARCH WARRANT WAS
TAINTED BY THE UNLAWFUL ARREST.
Deputy Hanks testified that after arresting the defendants he
caused their vehicle to be impounded.

He then obtained a search

warrant to search the vehicle for the items listed by Mrs. Talayumpteuwa
as being missing from

her apartment.

Over objections of the Defendant

Davis and Defendant Walker, these items were introduced into evidence
at trial. The defendant contends that such admission was improper
because the items were "fruit of the poisonous tree'1.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is an established
principle of criminal and constitutional law.

In Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963), the United
States Supreme Court suppressed narcotics evidence obtained as the result
of an illegal arrest and subsequent confession.

The standard enunciated

was that the evidence would not have come to light but for the illegal
actions of the police.
Utah Supreme Court.

This principle has

been followed by the

See State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d

422 (1971).
The exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is
where the obtaining of the evidence is so remote from the illegality
that it has become attenuated and the taint is no longer present.
defendant contends such is not the present case.

The

The evidence was

obtained directly as a result of the unlawful arrest, albeit pursuant
to a search warrant.

The search warrant was not produced at the trial,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-?S-

Ln spite of defendants "poisonous tree fruit1' objections to the
Introduction of the evidence.

Thus, there was no finding that the

warrant had overcome the "poisonous taint" of the primary illegality
>f the initial unlawful arrest.
CONCLUSION
This court is herein presented with an excellent issue for
lefining a "fishing expedition" search and arrest.

The overreaching

»f Deputy Hanks in the detention and search of defendants would prove
uccessfull in only a small number of cases.

In all others the rights

f private citizens would prove to be forfeit.
The improper introduction of evidence against the defendant
ubstantially prejudiced his right to receive a fair trial and thus
e should be entitled to reversal of his conviction and another trial
t which the unlawfully obtained evidence is excluded.
Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN A. WHITE
Attorney for Appellant
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